Optics 101
What is the Threat
Quantum computing
Quantum computers are moving from theory to practice. They’re not yet powerful enough to break encryption, but progress is steady. Once they reach a certain scale, they’ll be able to solve the hard mathematical problems (like factoring large numbers) that today’s public-key encryption relies on. That puts widely used standards such as RSA and ECC at risk of becoming obsolete.
Existing encryption
Currently, encryption is built on the assumption that some problems take an impractically long time for computers to solve. Classical computers would need millions of years to break a strong key. Quantum computers, however, don’t play by the same rules. With the right algorithms, like Shor’s, they could solve the same problems in hours or days. This doesn’t just weaken existing encryption – it makes it completely outdated.
Shrinking timelines
For years, many assumed this threat was decades away. That expectation is shifting. Gartner projects that by 2029, current encryption methods could be obsolete – forcing organizations to prepare sooner rather than later. Advances in error correction, scaling, and quantum-classical hybrid systems mean the safe horizon is no longer measured in decades, but in single-digit years. Data with a lifespan beyond 2030 should already be considered vulnerable.

Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL)
The most urgent threat is already here. Attackers don’t need to break encryption today – they only need to capture it. By recording encrypted traffic now, they can wait until more advanced tools or quantum computers exist to decrypt it.
Here’s how the Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL) threat works:
- Adversaries capture encrypted traffic today
- In the future, when new attacks, AI models, quantum computers, or other methods emerge, they decrypt it, or they obtain the key through insider threats, blackmail, or other means
- Your past data is suddenly exposed
This isn’t a hypothetical risk.
- Leaked documents (such as those released by WikiLeaks) revealed that the NSA and British intelligence agencies have tapped fiber cables to capture global data flows.
- Recent reporting underscores the risk: in May 2024, the Wall Street Journal reported on U.S. concerns that Chinese-controlled repair ships servicing undersea cables could use that access for espionage.
These cases illustrate a simple fact: if encrypted data can be recorded, it can also be stored and eventually broken. Sensitive information – financial transactions, healthcare records, intellectual property, government communications – is already being harvested with the intent to be decrypted later.
Existing PQR Solutions
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
PQC is the next generation of digital algorithms designed to resist quantum attacks. It strengthens today’s encryption methods by making the math harder to solve, even for quantum computers.
But there are limitations: PQC still transmits raw, encrypted data over the network. If that data is intercepted and stored, it becomes a long-term liability. History has shown that encryption methods – from DES and RSA to SHA-1 – eventually break.
PQC may delay that moment, but it doesn’t eliminate the risk. The data is still there, waiting.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
QKD uses quantum mechanics to secure key exchange, ensuring keys cannot be intercepted without detection. This makes the key itself extremely secure. But QKD has limits:
- It only protects the keys – the data still travels using conventional encryption, which remains recordable
- Captured data can still be harvested today and broken later
- Adversaries may put their hands on keys via other methods, now or later
- It requires specialized infrastructure and is expensive to scale
- It works only over relatively short distances, sub 100 km, making it impractical for longer ditances and submarine cables
CyberRidge Technology Explained
Our approach is based on patented photonic-layer techniques, detailed in our peer-reviewed in top-tier international academic journals.

How it works
At a high level, CyberRidge’s technology is defined by three core steps:
1. The signal is spread over a huge optical spectrum
- Using an optical carrier which is a mode locked laser spanned over multi TeraHertz
2. Optical features are modified by the optical key
- The dynamic phase modulator modifies the optical phase of each mode every fraction of a second
3. The signal is buried below optical noise
- The signal is aggressively attenuated;
- A true random spontaneous optical noise (generated by optical amplifiers) is added
So, what is the effect?
- The optical signal has been manipulated so that it became completely indistinguishable from random optical noise
What is the impact?
- What flows across the link appears to any observer as background noise – meaningless and unusable
- This process prevents any recordable information from being extracted from the fiber by an unauthorized user making post-processing impossible - elminating Harvest Now Decrypt Later (HNDL) attacks
- To be useful again, the signal must later be optically decrypted and reconstructed all optically in real time, prior to the optical-to-electrical conversion, at the authorized receiver

Unbreakable Key Management: Constantly Changing Keys (CCE)
- Key distribution is embedded within the signal and changes every fraction of a second in a secure, air-gapped environment
- This eliminates the risk of key interception, replay attacks, or insider compromise
Immune to any computing power
- No algorithm, AI model, or quantum machine can decrypt the data because there is no decipherable signal to begin with – only meaningless optical noise
- No raw data = no data to harvest now and hack later
Why this matters?
- HNDL threat eliminated – attackers cannot record useful data for future decryption.
- Quantum-safe today – protection doesn’t rely on algorithms or keys, but on physics.
- Works with existing systems – integrates seamlessly into current optical infrastructure, complemetary to PQC or any other higher-layer protocols.
A deeper dive
For readers who want the full academic treatment of the underlying principles and security proofs, we recommend reviewing our white paper:
- “Photonic Layer Security in High-Speed Optical Communications”
- "Photonic Encryption in field trial"
- “Photonic Encryption fundamentals”
These papers provide the detailed system design, theoretical analysis, and experimental validation of our approach.